tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post108952373950127865..comments2023-10-30T11:13:44.310-04:00Comments on The Ethical Werewolf ‡ by Neil Sinhababu : Why don't consequentialists go continuous?Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-1089798772213234502004-07-14T05:52:00.000-04:002004-07-14T05:52:00.000-04:00It's Dennis Clark, btw.
Perhaps this is a stupid,...It's Dennis Clark, btw.<br /><br />Perhaps this is a stupid, non-philosopher thought, but I'm tempted to say that that awkward set of categories is almost the definition of a system of ethics. I mean here that many would tend to take a "moral code" to be a set of rules dictating what one can and cannot do, which precisely means sorting behaviors according to the trichotomy.<br /><br />One can also posit (as you do) a moral code which simply assigns actions to points on a continuum of goodness, but that doesn't really dodge the question; discounting onerousness (a nontrivial assumption, as your first poster points out), shouldn't there be points on the continuum beyond which a reasonable person simply should not act (i.e. murder) and vice versa? But this then establishes your trichotomy all over again.<br /><br />I suppose it just means that free will means deciding how moral you're going to be, as always.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-1089745125619907542004-07-13T14:58:00.000-04:002004-07-13T14:58:00.000-04:00And I have to find out about this from Google Aler...And I have to find out about this from Google Alert? For shame.<br /><br />As for utilitarianism, I'm still not sure how you get from "pleasure is good for me" to "pleasure is good."Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-108960570453307622004-07-12T00:15:00.000-04:002004-07-12T00:15:00.000-04:00My sentiments exactly. Another interesting dimensi...My sentiments exactly. Another interesting dimension along which to see the awkwardness of the "forbidden/permitted/required" trichotomy is one I just ran across in Julia Annas' "Morality of Happiness": Where deontological theories cast moral choices in terms that seem <br /><br />"essentially punitive or corrective, 'the notion that morality is a life harassed and persecuted everywhere by 'imperatives' and disagreeable duties, and that without these you have not got morality'*…[ancient ethics'] leading notions are not those of obligation, duty, and rule-following; instead of these 'imperative' notions it uses 'attractive' notions like those of goodness and worth."<br /><br />Utilitarianism, like virtue ethics (the comparison may be more or less agreeable to you, Neil - I'm not sure how you feel about virtue talk, though it's at least obvious that the virtuous life is very likely to be a net positive w/r/t utility, and so justifiable in that framework), seems to have that 'ancient' view of life as something to be lived <I>well</I> (in some sense), moreso than <I>rightly</I>. That may sound a little selfish to people with a deontological bent - and utility obviously lends itself to more selflessness than virtue - but I think this may have to do with the unfortunate belief (exacerbated by deontology!) that charitable acts are necessarily onerous for the benefactor.<br /><br />Anyway, if utilitarianism or virtue ethics or any other humanistic moral theory can dissolve the awkwardness of that trichotomy, so much the better for us! Another moral myth bites the dust.<br /><br />*That's a quote from Bradley's 1876 <I>Ethical Studies</I>Brandonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02578347079961234153noreply@blogger.com