tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post2284395296181808973..comments2023-10-30T11:13:44.310-04:00Comments on The Ethical Werewolf ‡ by Neil Sinhababu : Xenophobia, partisanship, and epistemic peer disagreementUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-10062982963914816162009-10-30T05:58:34.315-04:002009-10-30T05:58:34.315-04:00On the first thing -- yeah, I suppose it could be ...On the first thing -- yeah, I suppose it could be the the broad degree of contradiction between their other judgments that's doing the work here. Maybe the epistemic peer judgment contradiction isn't that big a deal since there's so many other beliefs of theirs that are just as important.<br /><br />On the second thing -- nothing so far gets us to asymmetry. That all comes from other stuff.Neil Sinhababuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03249327186653397250noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-57221680866648323372009-10-24T22:49:18.792-04:002009-10-24T22:49:18.792-04:00I disappeared for awhile, but here are some disjoi...I disappeared for awhile, but here are some disjointed thoughts: <br /><br />Reading your comment, I realized there's two factors at issue, only one of which was in view in what I said. First, should you take your peer's opinion as a reason to change your own opinion. In the case at hand, this means saying "Europeans are my peers, and they think the Republicans aren't my peers, therefore I should decrease my credence that Republicans are my peers." That's an example of the standard question in the literature on disagreement. So if you hold the equal weight view, the answer is that you should split the difference, if you hold the total weight view, you might reduce your credence that you're peers with Republicans, but you might not. It'll depend on what the underlying evidence supporting peerhood looks like. <br /><br />Second, (and what I wasn't thinking about), there's the question about whether, once you find out about the Republicans and Europeans not viewing each other as peers, you should conclude that one or more of them is actually not your peer, on the grounds that they seem to have answered this question wrong. <br /><br />That's obviously a different question, since you still have to answer it after you've already chosen between the EW and TE views and adjusted your credence based on them<br /><br />That said, I think the effect should be pretty small. It's generally hard to say what evidence is relevant to peerhood, and judgments about peerhood are hard to make. Error about such a topic may not be that significant, at least so long as you're willing to endorse many substantive judgments made by each side. <br /><br />Second, even if it is significant, it should be symmetrical. I guess I'm not sure how you're thinking of the tipping point phenomenon that it's supposed to rule that out.Justinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12979095957410011528noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-44992074487333535502009-10-15T06:46:16.751-04:002009-10-15T06:46:16.751-04:00Thanks, Angus. The point shouldn't be "B...Thanks, Angus. The point shouldn't be "Both of my apparent epistemic peers agree that I have an inferior among them. I should trust the opinions of apparent epistemic peers, so I should believe that." <br /><br />I think the idea is more like this: As you say, at least one of my apparent epistemic peers has a pair of false beliefs, either (A) or (B). The other of my apparent epistemic peers offers me a plausible explanation of why the first apparent peer has gone wrong. This explanation entails that the other apparent epistemic peer is an inferior. (That's why the first peer got it wrong.) Except that I don't know which peer is which, I have no good reason to reject it. <br /><br />Under normal circumstances, if an epistemic peer offers me an explanation of this sort, I should accept it. The only trouble is that I have no idea who is who.Neil Sinhababuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03249327186653397250noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-40832876490205414442009-10-14T11:27:56.198-04:002009-10-14T11:27:56.198-04:00Whoops. I am wrong here: Likewise, then, we have r...Whoops. I am wrong here: Likewise, then, we have reasons of equal weight to believe that deductions from (A) / (B) are true / false. So considerations of epistemic peerage give us reasons of equal weight to believe (P) and ~(P).<br /><br />But not, I think, if we change "true / false" to "justified / unjustified," which seems to get us to the same place?Angushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11692562500798180624noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-75966309876969101842009-10-14T11:20:21.639-04:002009-10-14T11:20:21.639-04:00I wonder about this: "Each of S and T are con...I wonder about this: "Each of S and T are convinced that the other is their epistemic inferior. If you antecedently regarded both as peers, this should incline you to take more seriously the possibility that one of them is your epistemic inferior."<br /><br />It's certainly true that both S and T agree that one of S or T is an epistemic inferior. So you have two (apparent) epistemic peers agreeing that (P) "one of S v T is your epistemic inferior." Which sure looks like it should give you reason to believe (P) and, indeed, more reason to believe (P) than you would have if only one of S or T acknowledged it. But S derives (P) from: <br /><br />(A) T, but not S, is epistemically inferior.<br /><br />And T derives (P) from:<br /><br />(B) S, but not T, is epistemically inferior.<br /><br />So we know that (at least) one of S or T has inferred (P) from a falsehood. I'm not exactly clear on where to go from here, but it seems like this should play havoc with the strength of our reason to believe (P). Consider: S's believing (A) gives us a reason of weight W to believe (A) and ~(B); T's believing (B) gives us a reason of weight W to believe (B) and ~(A). So we have reasons of equal weight to believe that (A) / (B) are true / false. Likewise, then, we have reasons of equal weight to believe that deductions from (A) / (B) are true / false. So considerations of epistemic peerage give us reasons of equal weight to believe (P) and ~(P). Doesn't that leave belief in (P) precisely as justified as it was before we went through al this mess?Angushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11692562500798180624noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-17290953233262369382009-10-12T04:48:43.761-04:002009-10-12T04:48:43.761-04:00I'd welcome more comments on the philosophy bi...I'd welcome more comments on the philosophy bit. I don't have a clear view of what positions are available here regarding peers -- I've only read a couple papers on the epistemology of disagreement. <br /><br />But I think there's some kind of puzzle here. Suppose you regard S & T as peers on a topic like global politics that includes the question of who in the world your peers are. Each of S and T are convinced that the other is their epistemic inferior. If you antecedently regarded both as peers, this should incline you to take more seriously the possibility that one of them is your epistemic inferior. I'm thinking this will bring on a tipping-point situation where further evidence will more easily move towards thinking one of them is your inferior. <br /><br />Substantive political bit: <br />-Nuclear nonproliferation agreement with Russia<br />-Iraq withdrawal over the next 2 years<br />-Climate change, like you said<br />-Lower likelihood of starting new unpredictable and ridiculous international conflicts<br /><br />I agree that 'Republicans' and 'Europeans' are very broad categories. And I don't know if I can precisely describe the person who I'd regard as my Republican peer or my European peer. But I think there's some Republican and some European for whom the above analysis holds, even if we disagree about who exactly they are.Neil Sinhababuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03249327186653397250noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-29834879162468662172009-10-12T03:17:31.600-04:002009-10-12T03:17:31.600-04:00Philosophy bit: I wonder which version of peerhood...Philosophy bit: I wonder which version of peerhood you're working with, and which position on the epistemology of disagreement. I myself more or less incline towards the total evidence view, on which it doesn't obviously follow that you can't take yourself to be peers with S & T, where S & T do not regard themselves as peers. <br /><br />Substantive political bit: exactly what has Obama done that justifies those changes in European opinion? Obviously his attitude is very different than Bush's, and climate change is a big and substantive issue where he looks to act differently, but I dare say a lot of objectionable Bush era policies are being maintained. <br /><br />Also, whose peers? There is no country or political party whose median voter I view as my peer. I view some Republicans, and more Democrats, as my peers, but not the average voter of either party. And of course some members of either party are my epistemic superiors. So I'm not sure what level of generality you're aiming for.Justinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12979095957410011528noreply@blogger.com