tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post5656112734791521533..comments2023-10-30T11:13:44.310-04:00Comments on The Ethical Werewolf ‡ by Neil Sinhababu : Inference, perception, and babiesUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-80129304404861377712009-04-18T04:23:00.000-04:002009-04-18T04:23:00.000-04:00Or really I shouldn't say I don't have any clue --...Or really I shouldn't say I don't have any clue -- I just don't know what a good theory would look like, or what's out there in the literature.Neil Sinhababuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03249327186653397250noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-45300981850554134592009-04-18T04:22:00.000-04:002009-04-18T04:22:00.000-04:00Thanks, Dustin, I think that helps.
Jed, I think ...Thanks, Dustin, I think that helps.<br /><br />Jed, I think the motivations in this case usually are closer to avoiding external-world skepticism (you don't know whether or not you're dreaming) than avoiding dualism. Regarding inference, there's going to be a pretty contentious question about what counts as an inference. I've talked to some people who think that inference is a fundamentally normative notion -- inferences are things for which an agent can be held to account for doing incorrectly. Personally, I don't have any clue what would be a good account of inference.Neil Sinhababuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03249327186653397250noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-55992925133921969202009-04-17T01:16:00.000-04:002009-04-17T01:16:00.000-04:00Two reactions:
1) Why is conscious inference the ...Two reactions:<br /><br />1) Why is <EM>conscious</EM> inference the issue? If our brains are doing a lot of defeasible analysis (probably using statistics rather than logic) does it matter if it was ever conscious? If philosophers have a rationale for demanding conscious reasoning I'd really like to know. <br /><br />This anyway seems like an empirical question, thus a matter for cog sci -- is it not?<br /><br />2) You use the interesting phrase "the thing people want to say in epistemology" -- is what they'd like to say the real root of the argument? It certainly seems so in cases such as property dualism -- you have to want that conclusion pretty strongly to keep walking down that road. I have seen some pretty explicit statements of such motivations in other cases. <br /><br />But if this is how things often work in philosophy I find it disturbing.jedhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11258416181053973027noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-28516055604751410022009-04-13T17:25:00.000-04:002009-04-13T17:25:00.000-04:00Hey man! Long time no see!Interesting post. But ...Hey man! Long time no see!<BR/><BR/>Interesting post. But perhaps the argument for thinking that the experienced chess player's beliefs are non-inferential is not that they are <B>automatic</B>, but, rather, that the beliefs that the player would need to infer her belief from simply don't seem to be there. Of course, that's an empirical question that needs to be answered empirically.dustin lockehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12240156576005704547noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-61501911269283096592009-04-12T21:49:00.000-04:002009-04-12T21:49:00.000-04:00There's more to it than the connection with qualia...There's more to it than the connection with qualia, since there can be behavioral consequences. <BR/><BR/>You can do experiments with very young children that set up a perception that something is a single physical object and then contradict it, and see if they are surprised.<BR/><BR/>If I recall correctly, these experiments show that some aspects of perception of physical objects exist very early, and others appear rather later. <BR/><BR/>Of course, even if these perceptions were apparently non-inferential at birth they could (?must) still have been learned during evolution. Whether this would count as non-inferential would demand on what argument you wanted to have, and with whom.Thomasnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-90050214447900638002009-04-10T10:48:00.000-04:002009-04-10T10:48:00.000-04:00Good point. Also, if perception were noninferentia...Good point. Also, if perception were noninferential <I>per se</I>, we'd never have cause to do a double take. I recount a pertinent experience <A HREF="http://metaandmeta.typepad.com/strange_doctrines_under/2003/09/two-moons-a-deflationary-account.html" REL="nofollow">here</A>.Michael Drakehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06141593700908475896noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-7464734415207813712009-04-05T13:07:00.000-04:002009-04-05T13:07:00.000-04:00I think that this is connected to the things some ...I think that this is connected to the things some people believe about qualia; you can't, it is believed, infer to a phenomenal feel. If you could, then those inferential links would be the sort of thing one could use to start trying to give a functional account of qualia, which some insist can't be done. However, I think you're quite right; we can infer to phenomenal feels. I'm actually working on a paper defending a functionalist account of qualia relying partly on this point.Protagorashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12645042531440559735noreply@blogger.com