tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post7851487691161377641..comments2023-10-30T11:13:44.310-04:00Comments on The Ethical Werewolf ‡ by Neil Sinhababu : Epiphenomenalism about Rawls and my CV itemsUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-57571091880342614552009-04-18T04:00:00.000-04:002009-04-18T04:00:00.000-04:00Yeah, insofar as this is a disagreement, it's a di...Yeah, insofar as this is a disagreement, it's a disagreement about Rawls interpretation or how we should define 'Reflective equilibrium'.Neil Sinhababuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03249327186653397250noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-35423142604588089312009-04-17T16:31:00.000-04:002009-04-17T16:31:00.000-04:00Okay, fair enough. I think I would try to rope in...Okay, fair enough. I think I would try to rope in what you talk about under the heading of intuition as well, though -- we have intuitions about how to set our beliefs in response to disconfirming evidence, about what qualifies as evidence in the first place, and so on, in which case you're ultimately appealing to other (stronger) intuitions and the ones about concrete cases. But it's not clear that this is a substantive disagreement.<br /><br />JustinAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-83776052722869893802009-04-15T07:27:00.000-04:002009-04-15T07:27:00.000-04:00I agree with the way you conceive of the methodolo...I agree with the way you conceive of the methodology, Justin. Here's the kind of thing I was thinking of, though.<br /><br />Suppose a certain moral principle seems right to me, and my concrete case judgments accord with it. But then I discover that I only feel this way because my moral beliefs have been generated by a causal process that has no connection to the truth of the principle or the judgments. In fact, it's a process that systematically leads people to error about a bunch of things. <br /><br />Even after I realize this, the general principle and the concrete case judgments seem as intuitively compelling as they did before. But I judge that I'm no longer justified in believing in the principle or accepting the judgments. <br /><br />I think the way to talk about the balance of intuitiveness is that I now have a less intuitive total position than I would if I'd just clung to my now-debunked beliefs. I'd say, though, that it's still the position I should accept. And as Rawls lays out reflective equilibrium, I think he's going to end up disagreeing with this.Neil Sinhababuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03249327186653397250noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-70456924754174454762009-04-14T15:43:00.000-04:002009-04-14T15:43:00.000-04:00What do you have in mind when you say that the met...What do you have in mind when you say that the method of reflective equillibrium doesn't allow for your debunking moves? (This isn't an objection phrased as a question, it's meant as a genuine question about how exactly Rawls understood reflective equillibrium.) <br /><br />My assumption was that the method allows you to hold some deeply counterintuitive stuff, as long as that counterintuitiveness is "balanced out" by deeply intuitive stuff elsewhere. If so, then a view that rejected certain deeply held ethical intuitions could, potentially, still achieve reflective equillibrium. Am I wrong about that? Or do you mean something else by debunking?<br /><br />JustinAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-34349383344161859042009-04-14T15:39:00.000-04:002009-04-14T15:39:00.000-04:00I agree about the US. Andreas Follesdal had a pape...I agree about the US. Andreas Follesdal had a paper a few years ago arguing that Rawlsian ideas had a real impact on public policy in some Scandinavian countries, however.David Watkinshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14954313265808615991noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-79962050974986124042009-04-14T10:10:00.000-04:002009-04-14T10:10:00.000-04:00Hmmm. I'm somewhat inclined to go with Mill and t...Hmmm. I'm somewhat inclined to go with Mill and think that there really isn't a big sharp divide between hedonic and preference utilitarianism. Thus, I don't keep careful track of which kind people are. I'm told that there are utilitarians up at UMass Amherst, but no idea whether they're hedonic or preference. I also always used to think that Doug Portmore's "agent-relative consequentialism" was just a pose, and that deep down he was really just a utilitarian, but I haven't talked to him recently so I don't know if I'd still suspect that.Protagorashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12645042531440559735noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-83401653477817000392009-04-13T20:36:00.000-04:002009-04-13T20:36:00.000-04:00Huh, I didn't know things were going so well for p...Huh, I didn't know things were going so well for positivism! But yeah, I think utilitarianism is pretty close to dead in the US. It's still going strong in Australia, but I don't think I've ever met another American philosopher who was a hedonic utilitarian. (I'm sure I've met a preference utilitarian or two somewhere along the way, but I'm not sure who they are.)<br /><br />I have not, by the way, met Alistair Norcross or Peter Singer.Neil Sinhababuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/03249327186653397250noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7345275.post-1912692049125062962009-04-13T09:14:00.000-04:002009-04-13T09:14:00.000-04:00You think utilitarianism is dead on the American p...You think utilitarianism is dead on the American philosophical scene? Or was the reference to "as dead as Logical Positivism" an ironic reference to the significant revival of interest in the Logical Positivists (especially Carnap) of late?Protagorashttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12645042531440559735noreply@blogger.com