I gave a TED talk on moral luck Saturday at Nanyang Technological University. Probably the most fun example was about some hypothetical German cannibals a century ago, one of whom killed and ate some ordinary people, and one of whom killed and ate Hitler. They both had the same bad intentions, but on a straightforward consequentialist view (plus a few assumptions about history) the Hitler-eater kind of saves the 20th century.
I'm trying to figure out whether to add a section on shared agency to my book. I'd love to have an example where Harold and Kumar want to smoke together, so when Harold brings the rolling papers and Kumar brings the marijuana, they're acting on a joint intention.
I kind of like the view that morality is other-regarding, so moral value excludes prudential value. On this view, it's morally praiseworthy for me to accept severe pain to cause you slight pleasure. But it's still better from the standpoint of overall value and prudential value for me not to go through this pain for you. If I accepted this view, my moral theory would be youtilitarianism. (In my own life, the theory of sexual morality it supports is shedonism.)
Øystein Linnebo was my logic TA (or TF, as they call it) at Harvard. For years I thought he wrote his name with the empty set symbol because he loved logic so much, until I learned that it was a real Norwegian letter.
Footnotes saying "I thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue" sometimes make me wonder if the author wants to say, "Look, I know this is irrelevant -- I'm only discussing it because a clueless referee made me."