Happy Nousday!

October 15 is the day Nous and (I think) PPR start accepting papers again. I just sent a paper to Nous that I'd been waiting to submit for over a month.  I propose "Nousday" as a name for this occasion.

10 obols (pbk), ISBN 000000000001

On the right-hand side of the NDPR "Recent Reviews" page, there are images of the oldest known manuscript of the Republic, Augustine's Confessions, Descartes' Meditations, and Hegel's Phenomenology. I clicked to see if they had posted reviews by Glaucon or Princess Elisabeth or Schopenhauer or someone, but apparently the images are just there for decoration. I should've known; NDPR gets reviews up a lot quicker than that.

Planning world tour 2013

I'm on research leave in the first half of 2013, thanks to my department head's generosity in letting me teach extra classes in some semesters in exchange for time off in others.  The plan is to go on another huge talk tour like I did back in 2011, when I ended up giving 51 talks.  I got awesome feedback on papers, met lots of interesting philosophers, and in general had a great time.  So I'm eager to do it again!

The big project will be defending desire-belief accounts of motivation and the phenomenology of deliberation.  That's the side of my work that's gotten the best reception (the Nous and Phil Review papers are on that).  It may be time to turn it into a book, laying out the view, dealing with all the proposed counterexamples to the view one after the other, and drawing out the consequences for moral theory.  I'll also be doing some moral epistemology, and a maybe a Nietzsche paper or two.

The basic plan is to be in the warmer part the US from January through March, and take off from the Northeast to the UK sometime in April.  Then in late May I'll go to Australia and stick around for the AAP.  If you're up for having me make a stop at your department, send me an email!  

Ben Blumson's "Metamicrofiction" appears in Microliterature

Congratulations to my colleague, Ben Blumson, who has published a zero-word story.  I posted an equally short comment at the site.  

"The Desire-Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything" appears in Noûs Early View

You can get the paper here at the Noûs site, or download the nearly final version from my PhilPapers account.

As the title suggests, it's a defense of desire-belief accounts of intention. Opponents of my view like Kieran Setiya and Michael Bratman claim that such accounts can't explain our knowledge of our intentional actions, the way we can sometimes decide which among several reasons to act on, and the role of intentions in deliberation. I respond that desire-belief accounts can explain the presence and absence of these phenomena even better than their own accounts can. The strategy is to use features of ordinary desire, like the way that our desires direct our attention at things we associate with their objects, to explain why we typically have immediate knowledge of our own intentional actions and why intentions have the degree of stability that they do. You don't need to invoke irreducible intentions or motivationally potent beliefs to explain motivational and deliberative phenomena. Simple explanations that leave out these mental states and do all the work with desire fit the data just fine.

People have said nice things about the writing, and I'm very proud of that.  Here's one of the examples in the paper, which is about the limits of our ability to choose which of our reasons we act on.  The point is that even if you take something as a reason for action and have perfect self-knowledge and want it to be your sole reason for action, you might fail to make it your sole reason for action:

Jane has received a marriage proposal from the King. She is poor, and she knows his wealth gives her a good reason to marry him. She also knows he is very kind, and she takes that as a good reason to marry him too. But he is old and grey, and had he been a commoner, she would’ve politely turned him down. She knows this, and sighs as she thinks about it. For it means a lot to her that her reason for marrying be something about her husband himself, and not his money. Something like his kindness! What a wonderful girl she would be if she could marry him for that reason! She wishes she could find a witch to cast a spell on her increasing her love for kind men, so she could marry him for his kindness, but all the witches were burned long ago.

The desire-belief view explains the limits on our power to choose which of our reasons we can act on.  Even though she accepts that it is a reason, Jane can't make the king's kindness her sole reason for marrying because her desire to marry a kind man isn't strong enough. The only way to make it her sole reason would be to (magically?) increase the strength of that desire.

Anyway, if you thought that was kind of nifty, feel free to read the rest of the paper!  It's fun stuff.  I'm thinking that after this and the paper defending the Humean theory of motivation in Phil Review, it's time for me to write a book taking on all the objections to Humean explanations of motivational phenomena.  If you've got a favorite objection, let me know!

It's harder to come up with a good canola joke

Traveling through the Czech Republic for a conference two months ago, I saw many fields full of yellow flowers. I asked if it was mustard, and the organizer told me it was rape -- the plant from which one makes rapeseed oil. (Canola oil is a more happily-named variety.) He recounted a conversation with some Americans years ago when he spoke worse English. They were discussing social problems like rape and he brightly said, "Yes, rape! It is all over my country!"

I guess that's a "rape" joke rather than a rape joke, but anyway, Daniel Tosh was doing it wrong.

Distinguishing Belief And Imagination

...now accepted in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly!  Here's the abstract:

Some philosophers (including Urmson, Humberstone, Shah, and Velleman) hold that believing that p distinctively involves applying a norm according to which the truth of p is a criterion for the success or correctness of the attitude. On this view, imagining and assuming differ from believing in that no such norm is applied. I present counterexamples both to the sufficiency and the necessity of applying a norm of truth for distinguishing between believing on one hand and imagining and assuming on the other. Then I argue that the different functional properties of these states are enough to distinguish them.

It's available on PhilPapers.

Unequal Vividness and Double Effect

It's forthcoming in Utilitas, and downloadable at PhilPapers.  Here's the abstract:

I argue that the Doctrine of Double Effect is accepted because of unreliable processes of belief-formation, making it unacceptably likely to be mistaken. We accept the doctrine because we more vividly imagine intended consequences of our actions than merely foreseen ones, making our aversions to the intended harms more violent, and making us judge that producing the intended harms is morally worse. This explanation fits psychological evidence from Schnall and others, and recent neuroscientific research from Greene, Klein, Kahane, and Schaich Borg. It explains Mikhail and Hauser’s “universal moral grammar” and an interesting phenomenon about Double Effect cases noted by Bennett. When unequally vivid representations determine our decisions, we typically misjudge the merits of our options and make mistakes. So if Double Effect is a product of unequal vividness, it is likely to be mistaken. This argument, I claim, fits Berker’s specifications for good empirically grounded arguments in ethics.

It was loaded with Frankfurt cases

I was excited when the example in a recent x-phi paper began, "A trolley problem is hurtling down the tracks..."

I was kind of hoping that Judith Jarvis Thomson had unleashed it and Peter Singer would switch the track so it'd run over 1 deontological theory rather than 5 consequentialist theories. Unfortunately, the example turned out to be an ordinary trolley problem rather than a trolley problem problem.

You'd get a different answer if you went to Church

Can dialetheism help with puzzles involving the Trinity and transubstantiation? If the Pope says "This sentence is false" ex cathedra, what should committed Catholics think of its truth-value? These are questions I'd like to ask a Priest.

Now on PhilPapers

I'm now hosting all my papers and stuff on PhilPapers, since Google Sites has been making my recently uploaded PDFs come up weird.

Also, my defense of the desire-belief view of intention was accepted by Nous! I want to write a big post on this soon, but I keep getting distracted by stuff. But it's coming and it'll be good.

21st Century Monads: Achiever!

I'm on the cover of the Monads' latest single!

The second person

I have a tendency to interpret "you" in song lyrics as referring to myself. This can be unpleasant when I listen to punk rock and wonder why the singer is so mad at me, but it's fun when I listen to religious music and am told that I redeemed the world.

The ends of introductions

Academic book introductions typically end by thanking the author's devoted and caring spouse. Just once I want to see "And finally, I'd like to thank Jack, Rusty, Susan, and Brett, the three boyfriends and one girlfriend I had and lost during the writing of this book. Though I didn't spend enough time with them because I was working too hard, their senses of humor, good cooking (except Rusty), and skill in bed (mmmm, Susan) won't be forgotten."

It'd make quite a conference nametag too

As the APA begins, I remember how I felt going on the market 4 years ago. What if I didn't get a philosophy job and had to work in fast food, but my R&R went through and the Philosophical Review asked for my institutional affiliation? Would I list it as "Burger King"? Thanks to NUS, it didn't come to that.

51 talks, 6 months

It's been an amazing six months. Thanks to the generosity of the National University of Singapore and a bunch of wonderful people at philosophy departments around the world, I've given 51 talks in six months -- 42 in the USA this semester, and 9 in Australasia during the middle of the year. (That includes workshops on my papers, an invited guest lecture for a class, and a mystery event that turned out to be a 3-hour Q&A on my defense of utilitarianism.) I'm home with the family in San Francisco right now, polishing up the papers and sending them off. I'm also trying to get lots of exercise so that my pants will fit properly again after all the delicious dinners people fed me.

I was really impressed with how welcoming people were. My advice to any junior faculty person who would like to give a talk and has their own funding is to go ahead and ask! Especially at smaller departments that don't have that active a colloquium schedule, since they'll be very appreciative and up for hanging out with their visitor. I had great conversations with philosophers at places I didn't know much about before like the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, DePauw, IUPUI, Salem State, and the University of Portland. I had a good time talking with the philosophers at Boise State, who asked me to give a public lecture on Nietzsche (50+ people came!) as well as a research talk.

Oh, and the best accommodations I had were at FSU, where they put me up in a former university president's apartment that you could get to by putting a key in a campus elevator to make it go to a secret floor. Sometimes you feel like a rock star.

I mostly did the colder parts of the country in early fall and the warmer parts of the country when winter struck. Not only did this give me better weather, it let me use one set of clothes in all climates. The smaller amount of clothing meant I could fly carry-on, which helped with scheduling because I could get out of the airport faster. The big hassle was all the logistics -- having to figure out lots of intercity transit stuff to figure out where I could go before I could even ask departments whether they wanted me to come by got pretty tricky. But everything got figured out and I didn't miss a talk (thanks in part to nice people at Wayne State and Alabama who accommodated my train delays).

Writing on the road went really well. I'm a lot better at getting stuff done the morning of the talk on an airplane wedged between two chubby businessmen than I am with no deadlines ahead of me in my office. The office makes me procrastinate; having to give a talk in a few hours makes me write. Of the 10 papers I presented on this tour, 7 are under review now (3 are R&Rs which are now back to the journals) and I should be able to finish up 2 of the remaining 3 by March. I'll be setting up a proper website to house my draft papers in the next week or two.

It looks like I'll be on the road again from late April to July when this semester ends, as well as in the spring semester of 2013. My department head is great and we've worked out a deal where I do some extra teaching in exchange for my taking spring 2013 off. I was mostly in the Midwest and East Coast this time, so I should try to visit California and the Southwest when it's colder, or Canada when it's warmer. If you'd like to have me come by, send me an email!

"The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality" accepted by JESP

I'm proud to say that "The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality" has been accepted by the Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. Here's an abstract:

Christine Korsgaard has argued that Humean views about action and practical rationality jointly imply the impossibility of irrational action. According to the Humean theory of action, agents do what maximizes expected desire-satisfaction. According to the Humean theory of rationality, it is rational for agents to do what maximizes expected desire-satisfaction. Thus Humeans are committed to the impossibility of practical irrationality – an unacceptable consequence.

I respond by developing Humean views to explain how we can act irrationally. Humeans about action should consider the immediate motivational forces produced by an agent's desires. Humeans about rationality should consider the agent's dispositional desire strengths. When (for example) vivid sensory or imaginative experiences of desired things cause some of our desires to produce motivational force disproportional to their dispositional strength, we may act in ways that do not maximize expected desire- satisfaction, thus acting irrationally. I argue that this way of developing Humean views is true to the best reasons for holding them.

I submitted to JESP before the other ethics journals in its class -- the Journal of Value Inquiry, the Journal of Ethics, the Journal of Moral Philosophy, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice -- because it's open source.

Just sent off another R&R today, and I hope I have another happy post like this to write soon...

[Update] And it's up! Online journals are fast. Time between acceptance and publication was under a month.

They cost 10 coins

I'd like to carry my laptop in something that would give people justified true beliefs that a laptop was in there, but keep them from knowing. It'd be a Gettier case.

Platonic love

In a Platonic relationship, you treat your partner like an abstract object.

Grueling pace and generous rations

I took a long walk to the University of Portland for my talk yesterday, and near the end I came upon the Willamette River Valley. I was happy that I didn't die of dysentery on the way, and I knew that if I'd shot a bison I couldn't have carried more than 100 lbs of it back with me.